The Sieges of Alexander the Great Read online

  After the first naval sortie by the defenders, consisting of marines onboard eight triremes, Alexander responded by diverting construction workers on the mole onto the creation of a series of portable wooden palisades along both sides of the mole to offer some protection from ship-borne missile fire, along with the construction of two siege towers at the end, to reign down missile fire of their own onto any naval vessels that strayed too close.

  These two siege towers were impressive engineering feats in themselves, but are usually overlooked as they were on the mole, which was a far greater achievement. They were intended to be of a considerable height, so that missiles could rain down upon the Tyrians, thus preventing them from constantly attacking the construction workers.101 This kind of suppressive fire is something we saw to cover the retreat before the Battle of Pellium, and is an example of something we see repeatedly during Alexander’s career: the recycling of successful strategies.

  During the siege of Halicarnassus, Alexander had spent considerable resources building siege engines, only to see some of them destroyed by fire during an audacious sortie by the defenders. Alexander was evidently a man who, sometimes at least, learned from previous mistakes, and at Tyre he took steps to protect the siege towers by draping skins and hides all over the exposed wooden surfaces, essentially in order to add a flame resistant covering.102

  If, as noted earlier, the idea of a mole originated with the siege of Motya, then the idea of protecting the workers with siege engines would no doubt have come from the same siege.103 The surprising thing is that it did not occur to Alexander to protect the mole and the workers in some way, long before he suffered serious casualties. This reactive nature of Alexander is confirmed by both Arrian and Curtius who make it clear that the towers were there for the defence of the mole.104 They should also not be confused with the towers that were used to assault the walls later in the siege, these were two of the tallest siege towers ever constructed in the ancient world; the earlier ones on the mole were on a rather lesser scale.105 If Alexander had taken the time to protect the workers properly, this would have slowed the progress of the construction of the mole. What we see is a mistake on the part of Alexander, one caused by his impatience and carelessness, as the siege was already several months old, and he had not engaged the enemy yet. This impatience did lead to an overall delay in the project, which is exactly what he was trying to avoid.

  Curtius, several times, tells us of another key factor with regard to the mole: it was unstable.106 Great efforts had been made, as noted above, to ensure the mole was structurally sound, but the sand was likely very soft and the boulders probably continued to sink slowly after Alexander’s engineers had believed that they were solidly fixed in position. The likely instability of the foundations would not have been initially apparent until the massive extra weight of the siege towers was placed upon it. If I am correct in suggesting that the larger boulders continued to sink into the sand, albeit at a slow rate, then the mole would probably have been more stable closer to the shore where they had had the greatest time to settle into position, and most unstable at the construction face. If this is correct, then once the massive extra weight of the siege towers was added, it is no surprise at all that the mole became more unstable. The instability of the mole would have been increased by the prevailing winds in both directions, and by the waves it created. The effect of weather upon the mole is highlighted by Curtius when he mentions a severe storm that caused a considerable amount of damage to the mole, none of which is found in Arrian.107

  Naval assaults by marines aboard triremes were no longer effective in disrupting the mole once the screens had been built, and were in fact far more dangerous for the Tyrian sailors given the presence of the newly-built defensive towers and presumably increased patrols on the mole. The Tyrians at this point could see the mole growing ever longer and progressing closer and closer to the walls of the fortress and they determined that they needed to take more direct action. The mole itself would be difficult to destroy, but progress could be interrupted. The siege towers, being made of wood, were an obvious and inviting target; their destruction would allow naval raids on the construction workers to continue uninterrupted, and progress would be seriously slowed once again. In order to achieve this they again showed their innovative spirit by filling:108

  a cattle-boat with dry brushwood and various sorts of timber which would burn well, set up twin masts in her bows, and, as far as they could, raised her bulwarks all round in order to make her hold as much inflammable material as possible, including pitch, sulphur, and anything else which would burn fiercely.

  Athenian horse transport vessels of the fourth century were essentially hollowed out triremes, basically the same design as the standard war ship but with the lower banks of oars removed to create space for the horses. The Tyrian vessel described by Arrian does not appear to have been of this expected design.109 This vessel may have started out life as a standard warship, a trireme or more likely something larger, but it was further modified to fulfil a very specific purpose. The sides of the vessel were raised in order that it could carry more inflammable material, and presumably every bank of oars had been removed to provide even more space.

  Although Arrian mentions brushwood in the so-called fireship, it is hard to see where such material could have come from in the island city. It is unlikely to have been specifically imported, and therefore timber from buildings was far more likely to be the primary incendiary material.

  Arrian goes on to describe the accelerant used in the fire:110

  Across the twin masts they rigged a yard double the usual length, and slung from it cauldrons full of any material which could be poured or flung on the fire to increase its fury, and, finally, heavily ballasted the vessel aft in order to lift her bows as high as possible. Then having waited for a fair wind, they passed hawsers to a number of triremes and towed her stern-first to the mole. Before she struck, the men in her leapt overboard and swam to safety.

  The mast was, like the vessel herself, larger than the usual design; this was again almost certainly a bespoke mast designed specifically to allow the suspension of as many cauldrons of flammable material as possible. The fireship is a fine example of ancient chemical warfare.

  It had evidently occurred to the Tyrians that it was likely, or at least possible, that the ship would simply run aground on the edges of the mole without getting close enough to the towers to do any real damage. The device of significantly overloading the aft of the vessel with rocks and sand in order to raise the bows out of the water and allow the vessel to essentially land the front section of the ship on land and extend the range of the fire to the siege towers was an ingenious solution to a potentially very difficult problem. Again the Tyrian defenders show themselves to be innovative and inventive in their defence.111

  Delivering the fireship to its target was still problematic, however. Towing it from the front was difficult, partly because the fore of the vessel was out of the water and partly because the tow ropes would have to be detached before the tugtriremes ran aground themselves. There was also no guarantee that such a heavily laden vessel would maintain enough momentum to beach sufficiently to cause the desired destruction of the siege towers. Arrian does seem to imply that the fireship was towed from the stern, that is to say, from the rear of the vessel. This act is difficult to imagine but it does not seem to mean a pushing motion, but rather that the ropes were tied to the rear of the ship and the triremes would have been essentially alongside the fireship as they were pulling it. In this, they were assisted greatly by a following wind, evidently something they had been waiting for as it would further provide momentum to allow the fireship to run aground as far as possible. Whilst being towed, the marines on the fireship could ensure that the vessel was steered in the correct direction, and momentum could be maintained almost up to the point where the fireship was beached. The direction of the tug-triremes could relatively easily be reversed in order to get to a safe distance once
the vessel was fired. These tug-triremes could then also pick up the marines that would have been in the water and who escaped once the vessel was fired.

  The prevailing wind would not only have made it easier to tow the fireship onto the mole, but, once ablaze, the flame would have spread over a greater distance south of the ship (the attack came from the Sidonian harbour to the north), and therefore increase the likelihood of success by ensuring that the flame reached the siege towers. The flame on the fireship would have burned with incredible ferocity, but likely would have taken a few minutes to built up to its maximum intensity, more than enough time for the marines on board to make their escape, and the trireme tug-boats to row to safety. Arrian tells us:112

  Near the two towers they started the fire, and the crews of the triremes pulled with all their might until they flung the blazing cattle-boat on the edge of the mole. Before she struck the men in her leapt overboard and swam to safety.

  The attack was timed to perfection and, with the help of the following wind, the two siege towers were quickly ablaze, the flame retardant coverings nowhere near sufficient to resist the intensity of the flame. The Tyrians’ strategy was threefold, however; the second element was an order for the triremes that had acted as tugboats to stay relatively close to the towers, presumably one vessel to the north and the other to the south of the mole. The marines onboard these vessels had orders to fire arrows at the defenders who would have been rushing towards the fireship with the intention of dousing the flame. This suppressing fire helped keep the defenders away from the fireship and the towers as the flame was taking its hold. But one has to imagine that their efforts would have been ineffective anyway against the soon-to-be-raging inferno. The real intention of the defenders was probably not to attempt to put out the fire onboard the ship (which would have quickly become far too intense for this to be feasible), but to drag the presumably-wheeled towers back along the mole to safety. I say the towers were presumably wheeled else they would have to be dismantled and rebuilt every hundred metres, or probably less, in order to maintain the protection of the forward working parties. In any event, their efforts failed and the towers were quickly ablaze.

  Once the towers were fully ablaze, the Tyrians unleashed the third and final element of their strategy; as many of the defenders as they could manage, boarded triremes and sallied forth towards the mole, landing at pre-arranged points all along its length. Their intention was to cause as much chaos and destruction as was possible. Their primary target was the defensive palisades built along either side of the mole; with these destroyed they could resume their naval attacks with impunity. Other marine units were assigned to destroy the various artillery pieces that the Macedonians had stationed along the mole to help protect the construction crews. These attacks were devastatingly successful and once complete, the Tyrians quickly boarded their vessels and sailed back to the safety of the city having achieved exactly what they set out to achieve.113 The Tyrian sortie was well planned and brilliantly executed; each of the three separate stages of the assault was well timed and executed with precision and discipline. Alexander and the Macedonians were seemingly taken completely by surprise; they evidently reacted slowly and were not able to prevent even the landings on the mole. This is a surprise, as the triremes carrying the marines would have been spotted by the troops on the mainland as they left the two harbours and would have taken some minutes to reach the mole. This lack of response suggests that the attack was timed to coincide with the lunch break of the Macedonians. We know from later in the siege that the attackers retired to the shore at midday every day to eat and rest. The Tyrians had evidently noticed this tendency and exploited it to their advantage, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their wake.

  At the same time as the attack on the mole, Alexander’s foraging parties came under attack from Arab tribesmen on Mt. Libanus. Curtius tells us that thirty Macedonians were killed and several taken prisoner.114 There seems no particular reason to assume a coordinated resistance against the Macedonians; there was no reason that Arab peasants living in the mountains of Lebanon would wish to risk their lives for the citizens of wealthy Tyre. This was probably just an unfortunate coincidence; Alexander’s foragers were perhaps taking too much from the land and leaving nothing for the Arabs, or else they were foraging where they were not supposed to be. Either way, the effect was morale destroying when coupled with the actions of the Tyrians against the mole.

  However well planned a military engagement is, it can always go wrong. The Tyrians’ luck had held during the sortie, however, and that situation continued in the immediate aftermath of the attack. A massive and violent storm struck the mole and lasted for several hours during which time the mole was almost completely destroyed. Any remaining siege engines and defensive palisades were swept away and huge sections of the mole simply disappeared into the sea. The wooden pylons that had been driven into the sea bed to hold the large boulders in place were torn out, and the stone that had taken several months of hard toil (the Greeks apparently had not yet invented the wheelbarrow) to get into position fell away, destroying the mole almost completely.

  The attack involving the fire ship was a crucial event during the siege of Tyre: the cause of the Macedonians was set back probably months; the Tyrians had struck a devastating blow with little loss of life to themselves. The sources present a picture of Alexander acting immediately to reconstruct the mole, but it is more likely that he took a little time to consider his options. When the metaphorical dust settled, Alexander was left with the same choice he had had at the start of the siege: capture the city by some means, or leave a now distinctly hostile naval base in enemy hands, and the stain of defeat upon his reputation. After a short period of introspection, Alexander gave orders to his engineers that the mole be rebuilt, but this time with new specifications.115 The new mole was to be considerably wider than the one destroyed, although what remained of the first would have acted as the foundation for the central section. This extra space that would be created on the mole was intended to do several things. On the one hand, provide more stability in the event of another storm, but also to allow for the construction and deployment of more siege towers and artillery pieces to protect it and its workers. Two massive siege towers were also to be built on the mole; these were amongst the largest in the entire annals of ancient history. The new stability of the mole, and the fact that it could evidently cope with the added weight of these towers is another testimony to the ability of Alexander’s famous engineers. Along with the offensive machinery on the mole, the defensive palisades that stretched down each side of the mole were to be rebuilt. These were evidently very effective in preventing naval archers and slingers from attacking the construction workers.

  After leaving specific instructions for the reconstruction project under the command of Perdiccas, Alexander left Tyre for an expedition to Sidon, just to the north.116 With him were a relatively small number of troops, only the Agrianians and hypaspists, perhaps 4,000 men in total. Alexander evidently did not expect trouble from the areas that were already under his control.

  It seems that it was only now that Alexander was finally forced to accept that without a fleet he had little hope of capturing the island fortress.117 He would have reasoned that if he did possess a fleet, he would be able to attack the island from multiple directions simultaneously; this was how he ultimately managed to capture the city, but he needed a fleet in order to make it possible. The failure to follow this strategy at the outset of operations seems like a mistake by Alexander, but his lack of a fleet made it impossible initially.

  At the time of the orders to reconstruct the mole and the expedition to Sidon, Curtius presents us with a picture of a very depressed and disillusioned Alexander, a man undecided whether to continue with the siege, or to abandon it completely, his decision to stay only coming with the arrival of the Cypriot fleet.118 This is almost certainly another instance of Curtius misunderstanding or misrepresenting his sources. It is likely
that Alexander considered leaving, but not that he considered abandoning the siege altogether. He could never admit that he had been beaten, and thus Tyre had to fall. I see little reason to doubt, however, that Alexander himself considered leaving Tyre in order to campaign elsewhere, perhaps with Perdiccas or some other senior commander left in charge. Alexander could have done this in order to either chase Darius into the Persian heartlands as he had failed to do after Issus, or more likely to continue his naval policy by advancing into Egypt to capture the remainder of the Persian naval bases. Alexander was a man of action and sitting for several months while the mole was under construction, without being able to engage the enemy at all, would have been unbelievably frustrating for him. We do have an example of a similar action, the siege of Halicarnassus. Here Alexander did leave before the final fall of the city to continue the campaign, leaving Ptolemy and a detachment of troops behind to complete the capture. There may well have been discussions along these lines which Curtius has confused and conflated.

  When Alexander had marched through the Persian naval bases to the north of Tyre, in every instance the king or ruler of the city was away with his fleet fulfilling his obligation as part of the Persian navy. When each of these individual kings heard about the fall of their home city, they abandoned the Persian fleet to return home. This essentially meant that the Persian fleet had almost entirely disbanded (some islands like Rhodes were still loyal to Darius, however). Once Alexander arrived at Sidon and made the request (or order) for the fleets to reform and join him, many of the commanders and navies of these recently conquered cities joined Alexander at Sidon. Gierostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus, king of Byblos, both arrived after leaving the fleet of Autophradates. On a single day eighty Phoenician triremes arrived at Sidon, along with nine from Rhodes, three from Soli and Mallus, ten from Lycia and a fifty-oared vessel from Macedonia. Shortly after this the kings of Cyprus arrived with 120 warships. Alexander accepted all of these vessels and their commanders with open arms, regardless of previous allegiance, as he recognized his immediate need if he was to complete the reduction of Tyre. Alexander’s fleet, according to Arrian’s numbers, almost overnight numbered 224 warships, a figure roughly in agreement with Plutarch’s figure of 200 and Curtius’ statement that Alexander used 190 in the final assault against Tyre.119