The Sieges of Alexander the Great Page 13

  With the ships now properly protected, they continued to clear the area all around the circuit of the fortress of the stone that had been dropping there. As this work progressed, the Tyrians were becoming ever more desperate and had to adopt a higher risk strategy thant they had been comfortable with early in the siege: they resolved to attack the Cypriot fleet stationed to the north of the mole, outside of the Sidonian harbour.

  The defenders had observed a curious recurring pattern in the behaviour of the attackers: at noon every day the crews of the Cyrpiot fleet to the north of the mole landed on the mainland to prepare and eat their lunchtime meal, as well as to take some rest. When this happened, only a small number of vessels were left blockading the northern harbour. At the same time Alexander, who was invariably stationed with the Egyptian fleet to the south, would also go ashore to take a midday break. The pattern seemed to repeat itself day after day, and the Tyrians saw an opportunity to deliver a hammer blow to the attackers and to resume naval attacks upon the mole. This was a high-risk strategy as the defenders had no means of replacing any ships or men that were lost if the attack did not go according to plan.

  This kind of counter-attack during the enemy’s lunch break was as old as Greek warfare; the defenders were hoping for the kind of impact that Lysander had had over the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405.133 On that occasion, the Athenians beached their vessels in order to search for food; Lysander did not do the same but kept his fleet ready. At the appropriate point, Lysander attacked the few triremes that were left at sea and quickly defeated them, following this up by the capture of almost the entire Athenian fleet of around 160 ships and their crews. It would not have been possible for the Tyrians to entirely replicate this success as the presence of a large army on land would prevent the capture of the ships and crews; the Egyptian fleet would also likely cause difficulties. The best the Tyrians could hope for was to destroy a significant part of the Macedonian fleet, which would cause a very considerably negative impact upon morale, as well as possibly breaking the siege to allow supplies into the beleaguered city.

  It has been noted that, for a stratagem that was so common, it is very surprising that Alexander did not anticipate it and take steps to prevent it from occurring.134 On the surface, this appears to be true, but we must look a little more closely. The Cypriot fleet did indeed retire to the shore every day at a specific time for lunch, and left only a few vessels at sea. It is also the case that the Egyptian fleet appears not to have done this. All Arrian tells us is that Alexander went ashore for a nap at lunch, not that the Egyptians joined him. What we have, therefore, is the situation that Alexander presents many times to his enemies, just on a different scale and in a different context. Alexander left a ‘pawn-sacrifice’ to lure the enemy onto ground of his choosing so he could quickly turn an attack from the enemy into a rapid and devastating counter-attack by his own men. The fact that the Egyptians were stationed to the south side of the mole and could easily sail around the island and cut off the Tyrians from their harbour if they were not very quick in their actions would be fundamental to this strategy. The final piece of evidence is that Alexander had, apparently, taken to not going ashore for his nap (perhaps once the screen had been rigged across the Sidonian harbour by the Tyrians a few weeks earlier), no doubt anticipating that his carefully-laid trap was about to be sprung.135

  In order to hide their preparations from prying eyes, the defenders had erected a series of sails across the harbour mouth to prevent the Cypriots from seeing inside, as noted above; behind this screen preparations were finalized for his daring sortie. The screen must have been put into position at least a few days, and perhaps a week or two, before the naval sortie or the besiegers may have guessed something was about to occur. The Tyrian sortie fleet was quite small, probably an indication that they were running short of ships; these were four triremes, three quinquiremes and three quadriremes. These vessels were manned with:136

  Hand-picked crews – their smartest men, their best-armed marines, specially selected for their courage in naval warfare.

  Once the final preparations had been made with as little noise as possible so as not to risk alerting the Cypriot vessels stationed outside the harbour, they organized themselves into single file, removed the sail screen from the harbour mouth, and slipped quietly out of the harbour entrance. The men at the oars made not a sound, and time was not called; they were as close to silent as could be achieved in an ancient navy. When they left the harbour mouth and turned to come within sight of the Cypriots, they raised an almighty roar of shouts and cheers and they made to attack the enemy with all speed.

  What the Tyrians encountered were Cypriot ships that were either empty or had mere skeleton crews on board. Three Cypriot quinquiremes were sunk immediately and many others were driven onto the beach and disabled.137 One of the ships that was rammed and sunk quickly was the flagship of King Pyntagoras of Cyprus, although he was not on board at the time. The remainder of the vessels that were not immediately sunk were driven onto the shore. After the success against the remaining ships, the Tyrians evidently made to attack some of the beached vessels, with their marines disembarking and starting a number of fires. It is interesting to note that the fleet was the primary target of the sortie, not the catapults and towers on the mole this time. This is a clear indication that the primary purpose was to break the naval blockade and allow supply vessels to enter the city once more. They were more worried about this than about the mole. It is also a probable indication that the defenders feared naval attacks more than those from the mole, suggesting that Alexander’s naval siege weapons were highly effective and perhaps that the walls away from the mole were far weaker than those opposing it.

  As it happens, either by chance or by a designed trap, Alexander had not taken his usual afternoon nap, but had returned to the Phoenician fleet almost immediately after his trip to shore. One can only assume that the trip was made to trick the Tyrians into thinking this was an entirely normal day, exactly the same as the many previous days when this behaviour had been observed. Upon hearing of the sortie, presumably be means of a pre-arranged signal from men stationed on the mole, he ordered the Egyptian harbour to be sealed lest another attack be launched from there, and sailed with the remainder of the Phoenician fleet to the relief of the Cyprians. The defenders manning the walls of the city frantically shouted and tried to signal those in the ships, but to no avail, their attention was fixed upon the Cyprian fleet. Most of the attacking Tyrian vessels were either captured or sunk as they failed to make the safety of the harbour before being engaged by Alexander, although the loss of life was small as the sailors simply swam to safety. The further loss of warships was another crippling blow for the defenders. All hope that the Tyrians had of gaining some measure of protection from their fleet was now gone and the tide of the siege had well and truly turned against the defenders.138

  Alexander’s capture of Miletus (by André Castaigne, first published 1898).

  (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  The Myndus Gate, now restored, is the only surviving section of the walls of Halicarnassus besieged by Alexander the Great, (courtesy of www.Livius.org)

  The torsion catapults used by Alexander’s army were at the cutting edge of siege technology, (after Jeff Bum, © J. Sidnell)

  Two views of the surviving 4th-century BC walls of Assos in Turkey, showing how formidable fortifications of this time could be. These still stand to a height of 13m in places. (© www.HolyLandPhotos.org)

  Alexander’s mole is attacked by ships during his siege of Tyre (drawn by Didier and engraved by W. Roberts, circa 1848). (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  A Macedonian assault directed by Alexander during the siege of Tyre (plate 7 of 11 on the deeds of Alexander by Antonio Tempesta of Florence, published in 1608).

  (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  Engraved view of Tyre looking seawards, along the mole, before modern
development (engraved by Petit and first published in 1889).

  (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  A naval action during the siege of Tyre. In the background, huge siege towers can be seen on the mole (by André Castaigne, 1898–1899).

  (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  In the classical period, Lade (NW of Miletus) was a strategically-vital island; now the island is connected to the mainland because of the River Meander silting up over the centuries. The three peaks of the former island can still be seen, (courtesy of www.Livius.org)

  The Persian Gates. Alexander marched thousands of men, at night, through the mountains to turn the Persian fortification. (courtesy of www.Livius.org)

  Aornus (Pir-Sar) from the southeast, with the River Indus in the foreground. (courtesy of www.Livius.org)

  Aornus (Pir-Sar) from the northwest, with the River Indus in the foreground. (courtesy of www.Livius.org)

  The ladder breaks stranding Alexander and a few companions on the walls of the Mallian town (by André Castaigne, first published 1899). (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  Alexander’s lone defence against the Mallians/Oxydracae after leaping down within its walls (anonymous illustration from De Vaugelas’ French translation of Curtius, published in Amsterdam in 1696). (© Andrew Michael Chugg, www.alexanderstomb.com)

  Soon after the unsuccessful sortie, the construction workers on the mole managed to complete their works to the point that the mole now touched the very walls of the city:139

  The Tyrians had their present danger before their eyes and easily imagined what a disaster the actual capture of the city would be, so that they spent themselves so freely in the contest as to despise mortal danger.

  At this point, a general artillery bombardment was ordered all round the circuit of the city. This, as noted earlier, was one of Alexander’s hallmark techniques, and was ordered here partly as a means of reducing the numbers of defenders stationed at the walls, and partly as a means of probing for a weak spot in the city’s defences. Once the Macedonians’ barrage was finally underway, archers were stationed upon the giant siege towers with orders to rain a constant stream of arrows towards the battlements in an attempt to prevent the defenders from retaliating or reorganizing themselves. The artillery bombardment from the mole was to no avail, however, as the walls were far too thick in that sector to be seriously damaged by ancient catapults. Alexander then seems to have attempted to concentrate his naval artillery, now that the rocks had been cleared from the sea around the city, against the northern sector of the walls, whilst still maintaining some actions against the other sectors. Naval battering rams were also employed from a close range, but again to no avail as the walls were again too thick. These rams were mounted between two ships with some form of protective shed built over the top to afford them some measure of protection from overhead fire; the vessels and the rams were also covered in fire-retardant skins, as were the towers.

  Along with the naval bombardment, troop transports lay just out of missile range lest a breakthrough could be achieved. After relative failure in the northern sector, the attentions of the naval assault turned south in what Arrian describes as ‘feeling methodically for a weak spot’, with rather more success this time.140 A considerable length of wall shook after a prolonged assault and finally collapsed. Once the wall had partially collapsed, Arrian presents a picture of an abortive naval assault:

  Alexander then made a tentative attack – a probing movement, not much more, in point of fact, than the throwing of a bridge across the breach. The movement was easily repulsed.

  Both Curtius and Diodorus give us a rather more vivid picture of the assault, particularly in the southern sector of the city. The Tyrians poured down flame, arrow, javelins and stones upon the attackers, wherever they met them; in fact anything they could lay their hands upon as their very lives, and the lives of their families, were in the balance. In order to try to free the rams from the walls (they had been tethered to the walls by means of ropes), the defenders lowered long poles with sharp blades attached to the end to cut the mooring ropes. They also had developed a form of flame thrower, perhaps of a similar design to that employed by the Spartan King Brasidas during the Peloponnesian War. Using this device, the Phoenicians spewed fire and molten metal upon the attackers, and given that they were tightly packed (especially on the mole and in the breach), they did immense damage; many died and more were badly mutilated. This flame thrower was truly a terror weapon, far more so than the catapult. The Macedonians apparently did not falter, but kept advancing, even when they saw their comrades ahead of them fall.141

  Alexander mounted the stone throwing catapults in the proper places (i.e. on the mole, and onboard ship) and made the walls rock with the boulders that they threw. With the dart-throwers on the wooden towers he kept up a constant fire of all kinds of missiles and terribly punished the defenders of the walls.

  It was as a response to this constant attack that the defenders rigged up the windmills, which Diodorus notes as being of marble construction, to constantly rotate and knock these smaller arrows and darts out of the air. They also used the boiling sand at this point against the attackers, and filled hides with seaweed and suspended these from the walls in an attempt to cushion the blow of the stone throwers; these are fine examples of innovation borne of desperation. Diodorus goes on to say that the Tyrians were:142

  Bold in the face of their enemies, and left the shelter of the walls and their positions within the towers to push out onto the very bridges (from the ships) and match the courage of the Macedonians with their own valour. They grappled with the enemy and, fighting hand to hand, put up a stout battle for their city. Some of them used axes to chop off any part of the body of an opponent that presented itself.

  The naval assault had lasted until nightfall, and Alexander called a withdrawal. Diodorus and Curtius are almost certainly correct in presenting the fighting at the breach as being fierce and vicious; it is inconceivable that after a nine-month siege with the elite hypaspists given the opportunity to engage the enemy on land, or at least a breach in a wall for the first time, that they would not embrace this opportunity with open arms. Arrian’s description of troops being reticent to fight seems unlikely. Their only reluctance may have come from the thought of the flame throwers, boiling sand etc, and not at the thought of battle as such.

  After the initial assault was repulsed at the breach in the southern wall, there was a lull in the fighting. Diodorus tells us that Alexander made an offer to accept the surrender of Tyre. The offer, if real, was not popular amongst the Macedonian high command; only Amyntas supported it. The Tyrians were given two days to surrender; on the third day the final assault began. A delay is also attested in Arrian, although he attributes it to bad weather, and in Curtius where the chronology of the final stages is confused and difficult to follow.143

  Curtius also tells us that Alexander seriously considered abandoning the siege altogether after the repulse at the walls, and heading south towards Egypt. He goes on to say that:144

  After sweeping through Asia at a headlong pace he was now detained before the walls of a single city, with so many magnificent opportunities lost.

  It is difficult to see what these opportunities were specifically, especially in the light of his future conquests. It is highly unlikely that Alexander considered such an option at this stage: this section of Curtius’ narrative owes rather more to romance than history; Curtius also tells us of a huge sea creature that rose from the waters and came to rest upon the mole.145

  We can reasonably believe that Curtius has made a mistake. Alexander almost certainly did not consider abandonment, but simply retired for the day as evening was drawing close in order to rest his troops and regroup for a renewed assault the following morning. Curtius is probably confused with an earlier point in the siege, perhaps the destruction of the mole by the device of the fireship.

  The final assault began w
ith an artillery barrage, which was essentially a precursor of those that were to become so common during World War II offensives. After the naval barrage, two sectors were targeted for close assault: the harbour entrances and the breach.146

  Some of his triremes he ordered round to the two harbours, on the chance that they might succeed in forcing an entrance while the enemy’s attention was engaged in trying to repel the assault elsewhere; other vessels which had archers on board or carried ammunition for the artillery were instructed to cruise round the island and, wherever they could, close in with the wall, lying off but within range if it so happened that to get close in was impossible, so that the defenders might be threatened from every point and caught, as it were, in a ring of fire.

  In terms of understanding Alexander’s strategy, this paragraph of Arrian is crucial. It spells out plainly and clearly one of Alexander’s hallmark strategies, namely attacking the enemy from multiple directions simultaneously. At Tyre, during the final assault, it worked brilliantly, as it did in all of Alexander’s encounters.

  The naval barrage was conducted all around the walls of the city; once complete, a taxis of hypaspists under Admetus attacked the breach. Admetus was killed by a spear before gaining the walls, but Alexander, who was also present, pressed forward and soon the southern sector of the city walls was in Macedonian hands. It is clear from our sources that the troops were well drilled and commanded: they did not simply pour into the city as may have been expected, but remained in the vicinity of the walls to ensure the breach was held as more troops were brought forward after landing from the troop transports held just out of missile range.147